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Abstract—A method of failure detection in telecommunica-
tion networks is presented. This is a meta-method that cor-
relates alarms raised by failure-detection modules based on
various philosophies. The correlation takes into account two
main characteristics of each module and the whole meta-
method: the percentage of false alarms and the percentage of
omitted failures. The trade-oﬀ between them is tackled with
aspiration-based multicriteria analysis. The alarms are cor-
related using linear classiﬁcation by support vector machines.
An example of the proﬁtability of correlating alarms in such
way is shown. This is an example of probabilistic context free
grammars (PCFGs), used to model the proper runtime paths
of network services (and thus usable for detecting an improper
behavior of the services). It is shown that the linearly mixing
PCFGs can add context handling to the PCFG model, thus
augmenting the capabilities of the model.
Keywords— failure detection, linear separation, probabilistic
context free grammars, support vector machine.
1. Introduction
The domain of automatic failure detection in telecommu-
nication and computer networks, becoming an extensively
exploited domain, distinguishes with an exceptional vari-
ety of approaches used [1]. A broad spectrum of statisti-
cal/stochastic methods are used in failure detection, so are
signal processing, discrete time sequence analysis, ﬁnite
state machine methods, automatic reasoning, data mining,
various classiﬁers, e.g., based on neural nets. The mul-
titude of the existing approaches best proves that none of
them is perfect. By choosing one of them, a designer of
a network monitoring tool has to strongly narrow the area
of a successful application of the tool.
This paper presents a concept of a meta-tool capable of
integrating very diﬀerent approaches known from the liter-
ature.
The proposition assumes an open architecture of the pro-
posed tool – new literature approaches could be imple-
mented as new modules of the tool. The indications of
various modules are correlated, yielding a much more reli-
able assessment of the network state. Interesting is the way
of correlating indications obtained from modules of com-
pletely diﬀerent philosophies. The correlation uses linear
classiﬁcation and multicriteria analysis (we describe each
module with two criteria that seem to be common through-
out various approaches: the percentage of overlooked fail-
ures and the percent of false alarms). Several auxiliary
hard optimization and simulation problems: large-scale,
nondiﬀerentiable, nonconvex are obtained. We propose to
simplify some of them before solving, using statistical
methods.
A fundamental question arises whether it is reasonable and
useful to make linear combinations of outputs from various
detection procedures. These procedures themselves may be
described in languages strongly diﬀering from “linear com-
bining” – like some discrete approaches. To support our
approach, we use a very interesting example. We mix indi-
cation from two modules detecting failures based on prob-
abilistic context free grammar (PCFG) analysis of runtime
paths [2]. By mixing them we essentially enlarge the ex-
pressiveness which a single module had: we add a context
to the used grammar!
We have to make the area of application of our proposition
more precise. It includes an automatic failure detection,
where the management tool signalizies that a failure of the
network is present and possibly gives some rough infor-
mation of a type of the failure. The presented methodol-
ogy can be applied to detecting both service failures and
strict network failures. Though the paper more precisely
analyzes some service failure approaches, we will refer
jointly to both the types of failures using the short term
of “network failures”. Also, our tool would be suitable for
a broader domain of anomaly detection, where an anomaly
is understood in a broader sense that a failure (hardware,
network-software or network-service) can express also un-
typical user behavior, connected with malicious activities,
possible intrusions, frauds. Switching to making proac-
tive failure of anomaly detections would be possible, by
making some simple technical extensions, like shifting rel-
evant time sequences within the tool, during its learning
phase. However, there are bold challenges of failure lo-
calization (reasoning about the failure reasons) and auto-
matic or semi-automatic failure repairing in which our tool
would not acquit itself well. These are tasks by nature not
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well-suited for supervised learning methods, to whom our
method ranks. These tasks are solved by expert systems
and other artiﬁcial intelligence approaches.
In Section 2 we shall try to show the variety of existing
failure detection approaches. The structure of our tool and
the complex problem of tuning it will be discussed in Sec-
tion 3. A discussion of the soundness of the described
approach, together with the conclusions from our work is
given in Section 4.
2. The Variety of Detection Approaches
We shall give a ﬂavor of the variety of existing literature
approaches to automatic network failure detection.
Various methods use various data about the network, com-
ing from various sources. Let us, however, stress the in-
creasing role of the simple network management pro-
tocol – SNMP (see [1] and the references therein) in ac-
quiring such data. The network state is described by sev-
eral tens of thousands variables (so called management in-
formation base variables – MIB variables), which can be
probed at regular time bases. SNMP delivers variables con-
nected with the traﬃc in particular network arcs, TCP/IP
(transmission control protocol/Internet protocol) informa-
tion (traﬃc, number of open connections, number of pack-
ets accompanying opening and closing connections, or ac-
companying some errors). Other useful sources of data are
system logs, e.g., regarding line commands given by users
(the logs are used in intrusion detection).
Let us enumerate some important classes of methods used
in automatic failure detection.
1. Many approaches base on signal processing methods
and stochastic methods. Usually, data about the net-
work traﬃc in various moments are time sequences,
often treated as realizations of stochastic processes.
Such approaches can be often depicted as systems
with elements like a ﬁlter, a statistic estimator, a dis-
criminator, an alarm generator. The “systems” more
or less accurately follow the structure from Fig. 1.
An alarm is understood as a warning about incor-
rectness of the work of the network. An alarm is,
Fig. 1. A typical structure of the tools based on alarms generated
from continuous traﬃc time sequences.
however, easy to obtain and a rose alarm cannot itself
prejudge that a failure is present. Alarm generation
can be merely caused by exceeding some (lower or
upper) limit value of the traﬃc intensity in some net-
work arc. Similarly, the excess of some error frames
rate may be examined and, in more advanced meth-
ods, the excess of some thresholds of certain signal
statistics, calculated by an estimator.
A single alarm, when obtained in a simple way, is
not very reliable in detecting failures (e.g., it may be
false). Usually failures cause several alarms (e.g., si-
multaneously, a decrease of the traﬃc intensity and
an increase of the error rate). The alarm correla-
tor is an element obtaining the information on the
presence of particular alarms and, based on it, de-
ciding whether a failure is present (or localizing the
failure – in systems that are capable of doing it). In
particular, an occurrence of a single alarm at a time,
can be ignored by the correlator.
A pure value of some signal at some time may be not
very relevant in raising or correlating alarms. For
example, we would probably want to ignore some
short-term incorrectnesses of the signal. Thus the
described systems are often equipped with numerous
filters, transforming signals both before and after the
alarm generation.
An example of the class of methods being discussed
is presented in [3]. The traﬃc intensity in a certain
network arc plays the role of signal si(t) at Fig. 1.
This signal is ﬁltered (integrated within some time
window) to reject temporary incorrectnesses. The
obtained integral is some stochastic process; its dis-
tribution is modeled and estimated on a simple basis
of ranking its values into several predeﬁned intervals.
When the signal goes out of a certain conﬁdence in-
terval (the intervals are diﬀerent for various times of
a day), an alarm is generated (if the situation is not
only temporary – one more low-pass ﬁlter is applied).
An interesting approach is presented in [4]. Each in-
put signal si corresponds to a diﬀerent MIB variable,
usually representing traﬃc in a diﬀerent layer: TCP,
IP, data link. The idea is that anomalies propagate
through the network layers, thus should be observ-
able from diﬀerent variables. Filter F is an auto-
regressive (AR) ﬁlter of rank 1. The estimator, in
turn, calculates the defection of some simple statistics
of the ﬁlter output (which are based on the variance)
from the reference statistics (obtained from observa-
tions made in the immediate past – in some time
window spreading up the present). A big defection
means an “abrupt change” in the statistic properties
of the input signal and thus – a probable occurrence
of a failure. The volume of the defection corre-
sponding to input si is expressed by a continuous
alarm ai from interval [0,1]. (Value 1 means the
strongest defection). So we have continuous alarms,
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instead of zero-one. Correlating alarms is done by
calculating
aBaT ,
where a =


a1
a2
. . .
ak

, B is a symmetric k× k matrix.
When this value exceeds some threshold, a failure is
ascertained. The presence of matrix A, with O(k2)
coeﬃcients, already allows to model quite complex
correlations between the alarms.
2. An example of failure detection by discrete methods
is given in [5]. The authors have a method of dis-
covering dependencies between two or more discrete
time sequences, called multi-stream dependence de-
tection (MSDD). This method can be applied to the
problem of network failure proactive detection. The
evolution of the network state (some input signal or
some set of trivially obtained alarms) is described
as a sequence of discrete values, corresponding to
consecutive time moments, for example,
1 5 7 3 6
We can have two training sequences: one represent-
ing the presence or absence of a failure, another –
some network signal. Then foreseeing a failure cor-
responds to ﬁnding correlation between elements of
the sequences.
Finding correlation in MSDD bases on templates,
e.g., * in a template means “any value”. Continu-
ing our example, in the ﬁrst sequence let us denote
a presence of a failure by F, a normal network state –
by N. Let us have positive integers in the second se-
quence, coding the values of some quantity measured
in the network. MSDD can, for example, ﬁnd a rule
of the form:
N N N N N N N N N F
* 2 1 * * * * * * *
The rule says that, the occurrence of the event con-
sisting in an immediate (in one time instance) tran-
sition of the observed quantity from 2 to 1 indicates
a presence of failure in 7 time units.
Certainly, also more realistic, more complicated rules
can be obtained. The algorithm searches for rules
that have an outstanding support in the training data.
The algorithm uses a mere Bayesian apparatus.
3. While the researchers prefering methods of signal
analysis concentrate more on the alarm generation,
the artiﬁcial-intelligence experts more willingly deal
with the alarm correlation and also try to point out
the reasons of the failure.
In many works, like [6], dependency graphs are used
to describe the propagation of a failure in the net-
work. Some particular elements of the network are
distinguished (a particular device, protocol, service,
server, etc.). They are drawn as the graph nodes. If
a malfunction of element A causes a malfunction of
element B with probability p, we draw an arrow on
the graph, from A to B, and p is denoted by the arrow.
The propagation of a malfunction may be multi-stage,
ending with an observed failure. Again, using the ap-
paratus of conditional probabilities we can identify
the most probable initial reason of the failure. In the
cited paper, the way to do this leads through solving
a combinatorial-optimization problem.
Instead of using graphs, we can use logical expres-
sions of some canonical form, of a lower nesting
level [7]. Both the approaches need a laborious phase
of obtaining the necessary knowledge from an expert.
Both of them need a relatively hard updating of the
monitoring software as the network changes in time
(e.g., as it grows).
4. Detecting failures in remote databases (and other re-
mote service environments) based on run-time paths
is described in [2].
A runtime path is composed of events happening
in various places of the system. Events must have
a common request identifier to be included into the
same path. For example, an event can be a remote
invocation of a procedure, data ﬂow between remote
components of the system, realization of a database
query, spawning a thread by a Java application, etc.
A request identiﬁer can be a session identiﬁer in the
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP).
The simplest way to validate the correctness of the
path is the analysis of the delays between events. The
delays can have some reference distributions, build
during an observation of a normal work of the dis-
tributed system. The conformance of delays currently
being measured to these distribution can yield an as-
sessment of the correctness of the system state.
A much more powerful tool, so called probabilistic
context free grammar can assess the correctness of
the order of events on a path. PCFG (see [2] and the
references therein) is an extension of mere context-
free grammars, consisting in deﬁning probabilities of
the productions.
A PCFG is a 5-tuple consisting of:
– set of terminal symbols: T = {T k : k = 1, . . .V};
– set of nonterminal symbols: N = {Ni : i =
1, . . .n};
– starting symbol S ∈N;
– set R = {R j} ( j = 1, . . . p) of productions of
the form N → s, where N ∈N and s is a ﬁnite
sequence consisting of elements of T∪N;
– set of probabilities of productions P = {P j}
( j = 1, . . . p).
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The probabilities of all productions with a given sym-
bol on the left hand side must sum up to 1.
We can try to derive a given word (a sequence of
terminal symbols) from the grammar, starting with
the starting symbol and iteratively applying suitable
productions until we end up with the word. For sim-
plicity we assume that the derivation of any derivable
word is unique.
Example 1: Let grammar G1 be deﬁned by N =
{S,X ,Y}, T = {a,b,c,d}, R = {
S → XY (P = 1)
X → a (P = 0.2)
X → b (P = 0.8)
Y → c (P = 0.5)
Z → d (P = 0.5)
}
The derivation of word bc is following:
S → XY → Xc → bc.
We used the 1st, the 3rd and the 2nd productions, in
order.
The product of the probabilities of the used produc-
tions, 0.4 in the example, is the probability of the
word. If symbols corresponded to events in our sys-
tem (and words – to runtime paths) the probabilities
of the word could be used to assess the correctness
of a path (and of the distributed system state).
5. Certainly, other approaches are present. They may be
based on “standard” methods (neural nets, other clas-
siﬁcation algorithms, clustering methods, the Markov
process, etc.). Untypical approaches may prove use-
fulness. In [3], failures are suspected when the net-
work devices are steering the traﬃc in a “strange”
way, i.e., leading some arcs to an unnecessary satu-
ration. In Fig. 2 the saturation threshold for each arc
is 10 units, variables by arc denote the current traf-
ﬁc intensities. Then the conﬁguration of intensities
x12 = 1, x23 = 1, x13 = 10 is erroneous, arc (1,3) is
unnecessarily saturated, while a bypass exists through
node 2. The reasoning seems simple on this simplistic
example presented but becomes more sophisticated
when we consider longer by-passes and distinguishes
“commodities” in arcs, i.e., parts of the traﬃc with
a particular sender and receiver.
Another untypical approach uses the machinery of
reference point multicriteria analysis [8].
Fig. 2. An incorrectness of the traﬃc control.
3. The Idea of the Tool
3.1. Structure
Our hypothetical tool will contain failure detection modules
of various philosophies. The coexistence of modules is
possible due to their uniform treatment in the structure of
the tool (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Structure of the tool.
Each module consists of a preprocessor, into which the
knowledge of a particular detection approach is coded, and
a linear classifier. The input vector of the preprocessor
(representing the current network state) is transformed to
the output vector (preferably, a vector of reals), which de-
scribes the network state according to the knowledge of the
approach. The output from the preprocessor, in the simplest
case, would be the alarm value obtained due to the partic-
ular approach but will be rather some multidimensional
description of the network state, and the role of the linear
classiﬁer would be to transform it into a continuous scalar
representing the “normality level” of the network state.
Let us describe the elements of Fig. 3. We shall use a dis-
crete time t – this variable will take natural values. Some of
the quantities will be parametrized with this discrete time,
thus they may be represented as functions of t. The main
elements are:
1. Input signal vector i(t) ∈ Rni . Its coordinates may
come, e.g., from MIB variables collected at time t;
in general, they may represent diverse quantities.
2. Selector SEL – simple module selecting coordinates
of i, from which vectors si are formed, used by par-
ticular preprocessors.
3. Preprocessors Pi for i = 1, . . .r, their respective out-
puts ci ∈Rηi , respective classiﬁers LC0, . . ., LCr and
alarms ai(t) ∈R rose by the classiﬁers for i = 1, . . . r.
In general, each preprocessor remembers its inputs
for at most H time instances, so
ci(t) = ci(si(t);si(t−1); . . .si(t−H + 1)).
There holds ai = φ i(c(t)), with (operator “;” denotes
the vector/number concatenation), φ : Rη i being an
aﬃne function:
φ i(x) = ω i⊤x + γ i , (1)
where ω i ∈RHη
i
and γ i ∈R are the classiﬁer param-
eters, tuned in the learning phase, described later.
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We treat the alarm value of −1 as de facto absence
of an alarm, the value of 1 as rising an alarm.
4. Alarm correlator/LC0. It receives at time t vector
a(t) = (a1(t), a2(t), . . ., ar(t)). It returns a num-
ber greater than 0 (failure) or not greater than 0
(no failure). We do not equip the correlator with
an additional low-pass ﬁlter eliminating “short-time
failure indications” in our later reasoning, though it
is desired in implementations.
3.2. The Case of Many Failures or Future Failures
The presented tool could be only simplistically extended to
detect various types of failures, by multiplying the structure
from Fig. 3 for separate failures. As already stated, we
cannot expect great failure localization possibilities from
our tool, which is of supervised learning tools class.
It is easier to augment our tool for the case of proactive fail-
ure detection. It suﬃces for modifying the learning phase,
by shifting (in time) the teacher information of the state of
the network (failure or no failure).
3.3. Teaching the Classifiers
Finding parameters ω i γ i of ith classiﬁer is done in the
supervised learning phase. We have historical examples
e j ( j = 1, . . . ,n) of network states, where e j is an example
from a historical time t j, e j = ci(t j). For every example
we know whether it is positive, i.e., describes a normal
network state, or negative, i.e., describes a failure state.
Parameters ω i γ i, set to the solution of a certain optimiza-
tion problem, are called support vector machine (SVM):
minimize
ω i∈IRηi ,γ i∈IR,y∈IRn+
1
2
‖ω‖2+Ce⊤y , (2)
s. t.
−D · (e j⊤ω−γ)−y + 1≤ 0 for j=1, . . .n,e j negative,
(e jω⊤−γ)−y + 1≤ 0 for j=1, . . .n,e j positive.
Here e = (1,1, . . . ,1) ∈ IRn, C,D > 0. For the derivation
of SVM problems see [9] or [10]. Learning parameter C
controls the trade-oﬀ between the number of training ex-
amples misclassiﬁed by the taught classiﬁer and the sep-
aration margin.1 Learning parameter D is augmentation
of the problem from [9] to control the relative impact
of negative versus positive examples on γ i and ω i being
found (it will mainly aﬀect the later described trade-oﬀ be-
tween the tendency of the classiﬁer to raise false alarms
and to overlook failures). For a more thorough description
of the above problem and a solver capable of solving it,
see [11], [12].
1The existence of a (big) separation margin causes that the values of φ i
for the training examples are (much) isolated from 0. With a big separation
margin we can hope for good generalization properties of our classiﬁer.
3.4. Assessing the Modules Performance
Tuning the whole tool will be described in Subsection 3.5.
For this, however, we must be able to assess the quality of
tunnings (C, D) for a single module. This will be achieved
by checking the attained compromise between two criteria:
the number of false alarms and overlooked failures by the
module. This is important because the whole tool will be
assessed by similar criteria.
We divide some historical data about the network state into
two sets: training data and test data. We teach a classiﬁer
with parameters C, D. We test the so taught module on the
test data. We deﬁne function q : IR2 → IR2 as
q(C,D) =
[
num. of misclassiﬁed positive test examples
num. of positive test examples
num. of misclassiﬁed negative test examples
num. of negative test examples
]
;
its coordinates are our criteria (the rate of false alarms, the
rate of overlooked failures).
We make a parametric experiment – we teach our classi-
ﬁer for various combinations of C, D, i.e., for (C,D) ∈ X ,
where X is a ﬁnite subset of R2+. We obtain the following
attainable results set:
Q = {(y1,y2) ∈ IR2 : ∃(c,d)∈X q(c,d) = (y1,y2)}.
We have to reject clearly unnecessary elements of Q,
i.e., such elements that the classiﬁer for some other setting
of C, D gives one criterion not worse that in this element
and the other criterion – better than in this element. By
rejecting them we obtain the efficient results set (for some
particular Pareto order):
Q⋆ = {(y1,y2) ∈ Q : ¬∃(z1,z2)∈Q
(z1 < y1∧ z2 ≤ y2)∨ (z1 ≤ y1)∧ (z2 < y2)}.
(3)
Since during the later tuning of the whole tool will see the
modules only in terms of elements of Q (attained results
for the module) we shall need to be able to return from
an element of Q to (some) setting (C,D) that yielded it.
For this reason, the tool must now memorize the relation
between the settings and the attained results.
In the further analysis it will be easier to number elements
of Q⋆ with one variable. Let us number the elements of Q⋆
with index ϑ , ϑ = 1,2, . . . |Q⋆|, according to the growing
value of the ﬁrst coordinate.
Such numbering is not ambiguous: there cannot exist two
elements of Q⋆ with identical ﬁrst coordinates and diﬀerent
second coordinates: deﬁnition (3) does not allow this.
Now each point in Q⋆ may be the value of a function κ of
this index:
Q⋆ = {(y1,y2) = κ(ϑ) : ϑ = 1,2, . . . l},
where l = |Q⋆| and κ : {1,2, . . . l}→ R2.
Remark 1: The coordinates of function κ are monotone:
κ1 is an increasing function, κ2 is a decreasing function.
The increasing character of κ1 follows from numbering of
the elements of Q by the ﬁrst coordinate. The decreasing
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character of κ2 follows from the numbering and from the
constriction (3) of set Q⋆.
Finally, each module is characterized with its function κ.
3.5. Teaching the Alarm Correlator
The alarm correlator yields NSTATE(t)=ω⊤(a1(t), a2(t), . . .
ar(t))+γ , where ω ∈ IRr and γ ∈ R are tunable parame-
ters, (NSTATE(t)≤ 0 means a failure, NSTATE(y) > 0 – no
failure).
We have been describing some quantities for a single mod-
ule/classiﬁer. Since we now have to consider all the mod-
ules jointly, we equip these quantities with an additional
index i denoting the module number (i will run from 1
to r). So we shall make the following transformation in out
notation:
l → li, ϑ → ϑi, κ j → κi, j, C →Ci, D → Di.
Moreover, C, D and ϑ will be vectors now: C =
(C1,C2, . . .Cr), D = (D1,D2, . . .Dr), ϑ = (ϑ1,ϑ2, . . .ϑr).
We introduce function q(t,ω ,γ) assessing the whole sys-
tem:
q(C,D,ω,γ)=
[
num. of positive test examples misclassiﬁed by correlator
num. of positive test examples
num. of negative test examples misclassiﬁed by correlator
num. of negative test examples
]
.
The author would like to thank Prof. Wierzbicki and
Dr. Granat for pointing out importance of assessing the sys-
tem by such two criteria (deﬁned by the coordinates of q).
The choice of the compromise can be left to the network
administrator. In the sequel we shall allow this choice with
the apparatus of the reference point methodology [13].
We shall try to minimize both the criteria. To merit the
“levels of achievement” in the minimizations we shall in-
troduce a scalarizing function s
¯q¯,q¯ : IR2 7→ IR, [13] with
parameters ¯q¯ ∈ IR2 (the vector of so called reservation lev-
els) q¯ ∈ IR2 (the vector of so called aspiration levels). The
reservation level for a criterion (a coordinate of q) is de-
ﬁned as such that the user does not want the criterion to
deteriorate below the level. The aspiration level is deﬁned
as such that the user does not demand the criterion beyond
the level.
The user can change ¯q¯, q¯ and the system solves the follow-
ing optimization problem:
maximize
C,D,ω,γ
s
¯q¯,q¯(q(C,D,ω ,γ)), (4)
ﬁnding the settings C, D, ω , γ .
3.5.1. The Case of a Few Modules
When there are only a few modules, problem (4) can be
solved directly by a parametric experiment. Taking various
combinations of the values of C, D, ω , γ , one can examine
the resulting values of q1 i q2 by a direct simulation of the
work of the modules and based on this one can calculate the
values of the scalarizing function s
¯q¯,q¯, eventually choosing
the combination of C, D, ω , γ that gave the biggest s
¯q¯,q¯.
3.5.2. The Case of Numerous Modules
The number of combinations of the values of C, D, ω ,
γ grows exponentially with the number of modules under
a given sampling density. If there are more than sev-
eral modules, the computations become unrealistic. Then,
however, we can try to compute q with statistical methods,
using the central limit theorem.
For this we must assume that mistakes of particular modules
are independent events. This assumption, a bit disputable,
can be substantiated with the diﬀerence of the philosophies
of the modules.
We shall consider two cases.
Some test example corresponds to a failure. We shall
calculate the probability of misclassifying the example by
the correlator (i.e., by the whole system).
We treat ai as independent, discrete probabilistic variables,
where ai = −1 with probability (1− p′′i ), and ai = 1 with
probability p′′i . We have denoted p′′i = κi,2(ϑi). Recall that
ϑi is a parameter indexing the set of eﬃcient results for the
ith module. Later ϑi will be made variables for each i –
they will become decision variables in an optimization task
that will serve for tuning the correlator.
We have
Eai = 2p′′i −1 and Varai = 4(p′′i − p′′
2
i ).
So for the probabilistic variable ω⊤a (i.e., for ∑i(ω · ai))
we have
E(ω⊤a)=∑
i
ωi(2p′′i −1) and Var(ω⊤a)= 4∑
i
ω2i (p
′′
i −p
′′2
i ).
We assume that the probabilistic variable ω⊤a, being a sum
of many independent variables has the distribution of2
N
(
∑
i
ωi(2p′′i −1),
√
∑
i
4ωi(p′′i − p′′
2
i )
)
,
where N(ε,σ) denoted the normal distribution with ex-
pected value ε and variance σ2.
The probability of overlooking the failure by the system is
P(ω⊤aγ > 0) = P(ω⊤a >−γ)
= 1−D
(
∑
i
(ωi(2p′′i −1)),
√
∑
i
4(ωi(p′′i − p′′
2
i ))
)
(−γ)
= 1−D(0,1)
(
−γ−∑i(ωi(2p′′i −1))
4∑i(ω2i (p′′i − p′′2i ))
)
, (5)
where D(ε,σ) denotes the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the normal distribution with expected value ε and
variance σ2.
Some test example corresponds to a correct network
state. We put p′i = κi,1(ϑi). Using a similar reasoning as
2Since the variables have diﬀerent variances, one should assure that
none of the variances dominates the others, so that the conditions of
the Linderberg-Feller theorem are satisﬁed. At least, the modules should
be tuned similarly, in the sense that they yield misclassiﬁcation rates of
a similar rank.
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above, we can calculate the probability of misclassifying
this example by the system:
P(ω⊤aγ ≤ 0) = P(ω⊤a ≤−γ)
= D
(
−∑
i
(ωi(2p′i−1)),
√
∑
i
4(ωi(p′i− p′
2
i ))
)
(−γ)
= D(0,1)
(
−γ + ∑i(ωi(2p′i−1))
4∑i(ω2i (p′i− p′2i ))
)
. (6)
Finally, in order to ﬁnd the optimal tuning of ϑ , γ , ω we
solve the following optimization problem:
maximize
ϑ ,ω,γ
s
¯q¯,q¯(q1(t,ω ,γ),q2(t,ω ,γ)),
where q1(ϑ ,ω ,γ) is given by (6) and q2(t,ω ,γ) – by (5).
This problem is nondiﬀerentiable due to the nondiﬀerentia-
bility of the scalarizing function s
¯q¯,q¯ and possible nondiﬀer-
entiability of the necessary representation of κi. It seems,
however, optimistic that it has as quasi-analytical form,
i.e., to compute the value of the goal function for a given
argument one does not need to run preprocessors neither
use the historical examples. Finding an eﬀective technique
of solving the problem is the subject of further research.
It may be helpful that functions κi(ϑi) j and D(0,1)(·) are
monotone and weights wi can be assumed positive (if the
modules are reasonable their votes should be taken with
positive weights).
4. Discussion of the Proposition
Soundness and Conclusions
Implementing and validating the proposition given in this
paper is a large undertaking, involving an implementation
of several of tens of preprocessors and also organizing the
supervised learning, solving quite hard optimization prob-
lems, etc. Thus such undertaking is a subject of the further
research and here we shall only give some partial arguments
validating our approach.
The ﬁrst, fundamental question is whether it is reasonable
to combine particular methods from the literature (which
can be very complex and subtle) with the quite rough tool
of weighted summing. A very interesting example regard-
ing the runtime path method with PCFGs, supports such
combining. We shall show that by weighted summing of
the “probabilities of the words” we can extend the expres-
siveness of the method using PCFGs by context handling!
That PCFG are context-free can be expressed as follows:
the probability of a parsing subtree depends neither on ear-
lier symbols nor on later symbols (this is a disadvantage of
PCGGs, since many events in reality depend on the con-
text [2]). Let us come back to Example 1 from Section 2.
The probability of the one-node subtree Y → c equals to
0.5 independent of which the 1st symbol in the word is.
So the occurrence of symbol c is independent of what has
happened before (i.e., whether there was a or b in the ﬁrst
position) and amounts to 0.5. In other words, events “the
1st symbol in the word is a” and “the second symbol of
the word is b” are independent, which can be written as
follows:
PG1(ac) = PG1(a⋆) ·PG1(⋆c),
where ⋆ denotes any symbol allowed by the grammar at the
given position.
Let us deﬁne grammar G2, very similar to G1 from Exam-
ple 1 in Section 2 (even identical with G1 in structure):
N = {S,X ,Y}, T = {a,b,c,d}, R = {
S → XY (P = 1)
X → a (P = 0)
X → b (P = 1)
Y → c (P = 0)
Z → d (P = 1)
}
Certainly, for G2 there also holds the independence of the
relevant events:
PG2(ac) = PG2(a⋆) ·PG2(⋆c).
However, under mixed probability, e.g., P(.) ≡ 0.5PG1 +
0.5PG2 , events “a⋆” and “⋆c” are no more independent.
Namely, we have
P(a⋆) = 0.5PG1(a⋆)+0.5PG2(a⋆) = 0.5 ·0.2+0.5 ·0 = 0.1,
P(⋆c) = 0.5PG1(⋆c)+0.5PG2(⋆c) = 0.5 ·0.5+0.5 ·0 = 0.25,
P(ac) = 0.5PG1(ac)+ 0.5PG2(ac) = 0.5 ·0.1 + 0.5 ·0 = 0.5
and ﬁnally:
P(ac) 6= P(a⋆) ·P(⋆c).
Mixing the probabilities introduced the desired contextual
information handling to our tool.
Some preliminary experiments with teaching modules have
been also performed (see [12] for details). The main out-
come is an assessment of the form of set Q, giving ﬂavor
of what trade-oﬀs between overlooking failures and raising
false alarms can be obtained.
An experimental module had to detect failures consisting in
breaking one of the arc of the skeleton computer network
of the National Institute of Telecommunications. The mod-
ule had very limited information about the current network
state: as a single example, it had only a sequence of traﬃc
intensities in some other arc at 20 consecutive time mo-
ments. To make the job of the module more diﬃcult, the
sequence was normalized so as its variance was drawn to 1
and its expected value was drawn to 0 for each example. So
the module could only analyze the most subtle properties
of the 20-element time sequences. It did it using a simple
auto-regressive ﬁlter of rank 4 as the preprocessor.
The obtained set Q is shown in Fig. 4. For comparison,
a line representing the behavior of the random classifier
was built in the ﬁgure. The random classiﬁer classiﬁes
each testing example as positive with probability p or as
negative – with probability 1− p (independently of the real
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Fig. 4. Attainable results for the AR module.
current network state). By varying p we obtain the whole
line in the graph.
Even under a diﬃcult task posing, the AR module exhibited
an eﬃciency clearly better than the random classiﬁer. Cor-
relating several tens of modules of a similar quality would
probably be eﬀective.
In conclusion, let us state that it is conceptually possible to
join the eﬀorts of various literature detection methods, of
which no one is perfect. The main idea of the tool, com-
bining even sophisticated detection methods known from
the literature with the mere linear classiﬁcation seems to
be useful in some cases. The most important matters of
the further research seem to be: solving the resulting opti-
mization problems, incorporating some at least very rough
classiﬁcation of failures, making a thorough experimental
validation.
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